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A net assessment of the beneﬁts/losses of arms control treaties in terms of military 
signiﬁcance was required in response to the START Resolution of Ratiﬁcation. The 
response by the Executive Branch belabored smaller issues, avoided accomplishments 
and didn’t carry out the net assessment. 
The Cold War seems like a distant memory. However, issues remain that should 
be studied if we do not wish to relive history. How much did arms control keep 
the peace between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union? Did the arms control process 
pave the way to end the Cold War peacefully? Did the Soviet Union comply with 
arms control treaties? Was the U.S. compliance process a meaningful, truthful 
exercise? Were the Soviet violations militarily signiﬁcant? What was the net 
assessment in terms of military signiﬁcance between violations on arms control 
treaties and arms reductions pursuant to arms control treaties? Was the “ef­
fective veriﬁcation” standard sufﬁcient to protect the U.S. national security?1 
These are large questions, which we will only partially answer. The frame­
work for this article was established during 1990–1992 when Bill Ashworth 
and I were the two majority professional staff members at the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (SFRC), which were appointed to examine arms control 
treaties at the end of the Cold War.2 
In a previous occasional report to Science & Global Security, I  examined 
the robustness of the U.S. triad and the ability of Soviet defenses to oppose 
the triad.3 The primary reference was an eight-volume, classiﬁed study by 
the Government Accounting Ofﬁce, widely thought to be the best such study, 
and the follow-up unclassiﬁed Senate hearings.4 In this occasional report, we 
examine the issue framed by the SFRC in its Condition Seven of the START­
I Resolution of Ratiﬁcation. Condition Seven required the President to carry 
out a net assessment analysis on the good and bad impacts of arms control 
treaties. Losses from arms control treaties come from noncompliance to the 
arms control treaties. The beneﬁts of arms control treaties come from the re­
duction of nuclear weapons, the removal of destabilizing weapons or tactics, 
and the establishment of cooperative measures to increase stability between 
the superpowers. Condition Seven requires the assessment be carried out in 
terms of military signiﬁcance, namely the threat to U.S. nuclear forces. 
The efﬁcacy of arms control treaties was hotly debated before the SFRC. One 
side believed that arms control gave a predictable future that would avoid irra­
tional actions. The other side, championed by the Ranking Minority Member, 
Senator Jesse Helms, believed that Soviets would massively cheat to threaten 
U.S. national security. The SFRC national security staff was convinced that the 
importance of this issue warranted a serious analysis by the executive branch 
at the end of the Cold War. With this in mind, it was decided that a condition 
requiring a presidential report was needed to shed light on the issue. 
MODUS OPPORENDI 
Section I below displays Condition Seven and the SFRC report language that 
supported it. This is followed in Section II with a description of the Report to 
the Congress on Treaty Compliance. Because of space limitations we examine 
only the analysis of the INF treaty, and not the SALT agreements because they 
are too old, and not the START treaty because it had not entered into force at 
the time of the March 1993 presidential report. Section III is our conclusion on 
the adequacy of the presidential response. 
I.A. SENATE CONDITION SEVEN ON TREATY COMPLIANCE5 
Within 180 days of the Senate’s giving its advice and consent to ratiﬁcation of 
the treaty, the President shall submit to the Senate an updated and expanded 
compliance report in classiﬁed and unclassiﬁed form, setting forth— 
(A)	 a listing and discussion of the actions which are violations or probable 
violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, 
ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues; 
(B)	 a listing and discussion of the actions which are in compliance with the 
SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties; and 
(C)	 a comparison of the military signiﬁcance of those actions listed in subpara­
graphs (A) and (B). 
I.B. SENATE REPORT ON CONDITION SEVEN6 
The degree of Soviet noncompliance has been widely debated over the years. 
Condition Seven of the Resolution of Ratiﬁcation requires a compliance report 
on all the major acts of compliance and noncompliance by the former Soviet 
Union and its successor states. Our future relations with the successor states 
on arms control treaties will, of course, continue to be addressed in the report 
called for in Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. 
Condition Seven calls for expanded and updated compliance report that 
could well be the last such noncompliance report on the disbanded Soviet Union. 
This report calls for listing of all signiﬁcant Soviet and successor states viola­
tions and probable violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, 
INF and START treaties. This listing shall be accompanied with a discussion 
of the ultimate resolution of these issues. Second, Condition Seven requires a 
listing of the signiﬁcant acts of compliance to these arms control treaties by the 
former Soviet Union, and the successor states. This list shall contain the num­
bers and types of systems eliminated, such as silos, missiles, and launchers. In 
addition, this report shall list the aggregate numbers of inspections and noti­
ﬁcations that were carried out without any problems, as well as any for which 
there were difﬁculties. Lastly the report calls for a comparison of the military 
signiﬁcance of the acts in noncompliance as compared to the acts of compliance. 
In the committee’s view, the arms control process with the Soviets and their 
successors, on balance, has paved the way towards the reductions in the START 
Treaty and the deeper reductions in the prospective de-MIRVing Treaty. The 
report required in Condition Seven serves as a useful adjunct when considering 
the net beneﬁt of arms control agreements with the former Soviets. 
The committee therefore recommends a condition requiring the submission 
of a Presidential Report on Treaty Compliance and the Military Signiﬁcance of 
Treaty Violations within 180 days of the Senate’s giving its advice and consent 
to the ratiﬁcation of the START Treaty. This updated and expanded compliance 
report will differ from annual Pell report (Section 52 of the ACDA Act) by listing 
all the actions of compliance and all the actions of past violation, or probable 
past violation, and then comparing the military signiﬁcance of these two kinds 
of actions. 
II. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT OF MARCH 1993 
The Presidential Report consisted of one page of introduction, 11 pages on vi­
olations, 2.3 pages on acts of compliance, and 1.3 pages on a net assessment. 
The most clear-cut violations listed were as follows: The Krasnoyarsk radar 
(which was to be converted into a furniture factory) was a clear-cut violation to 
the ABM Treaty, but it was not militarily signiﬁcant in a capacity to help shoot 
down U.S. ICBMs. The second “new type missile” (the SS-25) was a violation 
to the START II Agreement. Condition Seven did not address nuclear testing, 
but if it had, it should have discussed the history of the “likely violation” of 
the Threshold Test Ban Treat (TTBT). This charge was removed in 1990 after 
the 1988 CORRTEX measurements at Semipalatinsk Test Site and after prop­
erly taking into account the geological differences between test sites.7 The U.S. 
record on TTBT noncompliance charges was not entirely honorable. 
II.A. VIOLATIONS TO THE INF TREATY (EXCERPTS FROM THE 
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT) 
1. Transits of Missiles on Launchers. The intermediate-range missiles may be 
carried on their launchers only at repair or elimination facilities and not 
so carried for transit to other locations. The Soviets had notiﬁed the U.S. 
of nearly 200 such transits to fulﬁll the terms of the INF treaty. After dis­
cussions in the Special Veriﬁcation Commission, the Soviets changed their 
transit practices. 
2. Non-declared Treaty-Limited Items. In the summer of 1988 the Soviets had 
some errors in their data in the Memorandum of Understanding, which they 
corrected. 
3. Un-notiﬁed Movements of Training Launchers. There was a disagreement 
on whether notiﬁcation was necessary for moving training launchers. The 
Soviets later agreed to do this. 
4. Missiles at an Elimination Facility. Two SS-12 missiles that should have 
been removed were discovered at the Saryozek Main Operating Base. 
5. Missiles at Non-declared Locations. For brief times, some SS-20 missiles 
and launchers were parked outside of two launch-to-destruction elimination 
sites. The boundaries of the two sites were redrawn since these were parked 
at these locations as a temporary convenience. 
6. Cargoscan. For 10 days in March 1990 the Soviets refused to allow Cargoscan 
to x-ray image missiles the Votkinsk missile factory exit portal. The Soviets 
had objections to U.S. procedures, which were then modiﬁed for Soviet 
acceptance. 
II.B. PROBABLE VIOLATION TO THE INF TREATY 
SS-23 Missiles: Article I of the INF Treaty provides that each party shall elimi­
nate all “its” intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and not have such 
systems thereafter. Article V repeats the requirement that each Party eliminate 
all “its” shorter-range missiles of the categories “listed in the Memorandum 
of Understanding . . . ” Article VI contains a prohibition against producing or 
ﬂight-testing any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Read together, 
these provisions in effect also contain a prohibition on transfer of treaty-limited 
items after Treaty signature: each Party must destroy all of its intermediate-
range and shorter-range missiles and may not produce any such missiles in the 
future for any purpose, including transfer. 
In early 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) publicly stated 
that it was eliminating SS-23 missiles located there, the United States became 
aware for the ﬁrst time of the existence of SS-23 missiles in three Eastern 
European countries. The Soviet Union stated they transferred SS-23s to the 
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, prior to entry into force of the INF Treaty. 
None of these three countries is a party to the INF Treaty. SS-23 missiles are 
shorter-range missiles that are listed in the INF Treaty. Soviet SS-23 missiles 
were to have been eliminated by November 1, 1989. 
The issue of whether the existence of these SS-23 missiles violated the INF 
Treaty was ﬁrst examined and reported in the February 1991 President’s Non­
compliance Report. In September 1991, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma­
ment Agency submitted a Supplemental Report to Congress on SS-23 Missiles 
in Eastern Europe. That Supplemental Report stated the ﬁnding that the Soviet 
Union: 
had understandings that constituted what amounted to an undisclosed pro­
gram of cooperation. Thus, the United States has reafﬁrmed its previous ﬁnding 
that the Soviet Union negotiated in bad faith. The United States further found 
that the Soviet Union has probably violated the Elimination Protocol of the Treaty 
by failing to eliminate in accordance with Treaty procedures, re-entry vehicles as­
sociated with and released from programs of cooperation. 
II.C. ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY TO THE INF TREATY 
The Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) 
and facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the United States. Since the last re­
port, the Soviet Union and new states of the former Soviet Union continued 
to allow the United States to exercise its inspection rights contained in the 
INF Treaty. These inspections included the presence of the United States’ con­
tinuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russian Federation; and the 
conduct of on-site inspections by the United States. 
II.D. NET ASSESSMENT ON THE INF TREATY 
Prior to the signing of the INF Treaty, serious concerns existed within the 
United States and among our allies concerning the threat posed by Soviet INF 
systems—particularly the mobile SS-20 missile. Under the INF Treaty, the 
Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and 
facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the United States. The United States is 
concerned over the continued existence of the SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe 
and continues to pursue their destruction in order to fulﬁll the objective of 
the INF Treaty to eliminate this class of missiles. On balance, however, the 
achievements of the INF Treaty have strengthened western security. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REPORT 
The Presidential Report on noncompliance is made up of poor scholarship 
and errors of omission. The length of Presidential Report was divided as fol­
lows: violations (4 pages), compliant acts (0.2 pages), net assessment analysis 
(0.2 pages). Thus, violations got twenty times the space, compared to compliant 
acts and compared to the net assessment analysis. This is particularly shame­
ful because greater analysis already existed in the published SFRC Report on 
the START Treaty, which is given below. 
III.A. VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY 
SS-23 Issue in SFRC START Report8 
The issue of undeclared the Soviet-manufactured SS–23s located in Eastern 
Europe has been addressed in a separate report (September 19, 1991) to the 
Congress. The Soviets had not declared the 72 SS-23 missiles involved in the 
programs of cooperation with the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the U.S. had not asked about these kinds of 
programs during the negotiation of the INF Treaty, partly because the U.S. did 
not wish to discuss the situation of the Pershing-I missiles that were owned (and 
later destroyed) by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pershing-I systems 
were under the joint control of the FRG and the U.S. 
In a response to a question by Senator Pressler on the ultimate disposition 
of the SS-23s, the Administration stated: 
German, Czech and Slovak federal governments have indicated that the mis­
siles in their possession would be destroyed when technical and environmental 
matters were resolved. Bulgaria, however has made conﬂicting statements on 
whether it will destroy its missiles. While continuing to press for destruction of 
the SS-23s, it is not in our interests to the delay reaping the beneﬁts of START 
pending SS-23 destruction. 
CONCLUSION ON INF VIOLATIONS 
The six violations to the INF Treaty listed in the Presidential Report were not 
militarily signiﬁcant. The issues raised were mostly a matter of sloppiness on 
the Soviet side and some disagreement as to procedures. The INF Treaty was 
very complicated to administer. This was particularly difﬁcult for the decaying 
Soviet Union in 1988 to 1991. Because of these procedural problems on the INF 
Treaty, the START Treaty gave more certainty by growing to 280 pages, plus 
considerable auxiliary documents. The issue of the probable violation of SS-23 
missiles was discussed in more detail in the SFRC START Report, which was 
available to the Executive Branch, than in the Presidential report. The SS-23 
issue is confusing because the U.S. had a similar situation at the time of the 
negotiation, namely weapon systems shared with its ally Germany. 
III.B. ACTS OF COMPLIANCE TO THE INF TREATY 
INF Compliance Data in START Report, but Neglected 
in the Presidential Report9 
As of May 31, 1991, the Soviet Union eliminated all of its declared inter­
mediate range missiles and launchers, and all of its declared shorter-range 
missiles and launchers. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the Soviets eliminated 
1,846 missiles with the capability to carry 3,154 warheads, and it destroyed 
825 launchers. 
5 SS-5 missiles; 
654 SS-20 missiles (3 warheads each); 
509 SS-20 lauchers; 
149 SS-4 missiles; 
72 SS-4 launchers; 
718 SS-12 missiles; 
132 SS-12 launchers; 
239 SS-23 missiles; 
106 SS-23 launchers; 
80 SSC-X-4 missiles; 
6 SSC-X-4 launchers. 
CONCLUSION ON INF COMPLIANT ACTS 
The Presidential Report states only that the “Soviet Union eliminated all its 
declared INF Treaty limited items and facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the 
United States.” This meager answer does not give the readily available data 
listed above from the SFRC report. In addition, the Presidential Report did not 
give the required information on inspections. 
III.C. NET ASSESSMENT ON THE INF TREATY 
Senate Report Language entitled the required report as the Presidential Report 
on Treaty Compliance and the Military Signiﬁcance of Treaty Violations. As an  
indictor of what the report became, the executive branch removed the Presi­
dential authorship and reduced the scope by deleting Military Signiﬁcance of 
Treaty Violations. The ﬁnal report was merely named the Report to Congress 
on Treaty Compliance. The 0.2 pages of net beneﬁt analysis in the Presiden­
tial Report primarily discuss the SS-23 situation. By 1993, the Soviets had lost 
control of its allies for four years, as the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. 
The Presidential Report addressed the net assessment issue with but one 
sentence, “On balance, however, the achievements of the INF Treaty have 
strengthened western security.” This cursory answer does not tell the Congress 
the military signiﬁcance of the Soviet Union eliminating all of its declared in­
termediate range missiles and launchers, and all of its declared shorter-range 
missiles and launchers. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the Soviets eliminated 
1,846 missiles with the capability to carry 3,154 warheads, and it destroyed 
825 launchers. The cursory answer does not give the military signiﬁcance of 
the six INF violations and the one probable violation. 
The Presidential Report should have informed us that the number of Soviet 
removed warheads (3,154) is over three times the number of U.S. removed war­
heads (856). In addition, the Presidential Report should have given estimates of 
the effectiveness of these warheads on allied targets. Such a quantitative anal­
ysis was carried out on page 52 of the Senate Report on START, which used an 
exchange model to determine survivable forces, with and without violations. 
There is a strange lesson to be learned here. It should be clear to most 
readers that the INF Treaty was necessary to end the Cold War peacefully. 
Without the INF Treaty, it is unlikely that the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty would have allowed reductions in conventional arms. Without 
CFE, there would not have been START, thus making the ending of the Cold 
War more difﬁcult. The authors of the Presidential Report did not want to make 
these kinds of positive statements on arms control, nor did they give the speciﬁc 
accomplishments of arms control. This is an important lesson for historians and 
future leaders. 
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